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Abstract 
The autonomy of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) raises concerns about how to keep 
them accountable. Remarkably, the process of Europeanisation has led to the emergence of a 
multilevel regulatory system linking IRAs to national and supranational actors but, on the 
other side, this process has influenced the capacity to make IRAs accountable. The literature 
about the accountability deficit of IRAs has tried to address this question, but the interplay 
between delegation, ‘multi-levelisation’ and accountability has not been thoroughly 
investigated yet. Notably, theoretical analysis of IRAs’ accountability in multi-level 
regulatory environments is still scarce. This article is aimed at contributing to the debate by 
pointing out that any theoretical discussion about the accountability of IRAs should be framed 
in normative terms and, precisely, should reconsider a crucial dimension neglected so far, that 
is, the goals accountability is expected to achieve. The article, in fact, argues that in multi-
level regulatory environments the impact of devices adopted to improve the accountability of 
IRAs is generally weakened by the presence of a ‘neutral’ idea of accountability, which 
diluted its power. The only way to strengthen the effect of accountability is to bring politics 
and democratic values back into the regulatory process. 
 
Keywords: Independent regulatory agencies, accountability, multi-level regulation, principal-
agent model, accountability pitfalls, democratic goals. 
 
 
 
  
2 
Introduction 
The delegation of regulatory competences to non-elected bodies has become a reality 
almost everywhere. As a consequence of public utility liberalisation, economic integration, 
Europeanisation, and reforms of Public Administration started in the 1980s, a gradual process 
of ‘agencification of regulatory functions’ (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2010, 343; Levi-Faur, 
2011, 7) has paved the way for a widespread diffusion across the world of a particular type of 
non-elected body: Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs, hereafter)1. IRAs could be 
defined as organisations made by impartial experts, independent from external pressures, 
charged by political actors with specific regulatory powers (La Spina and Majone 2000, 7). 
Although IRAs’ diffusion is now accepted as a matter of fact, their independent nature raises 
concerns about how to keep them under control or accountable. In broad terms, accountability 
refers to the obligation for an individual or organisation to account for his/her conduct toward 
another person or organisation (Bovens 2007, 450). Accountability entails an obligation for 
an actor, the accountability holder (Behn 2001, 2), to regularly render account and to justify 
his/her actions to a specific forum that can sanction him/her for possible misconduct (Bovens 
2007, 455-457; 2010, 952; Busuioc 2009; 2012). Two distinguished features of this process 
are, therefore, the dialogic nature of the relationship between the accountability holder and the 
forum and the risk to face sanctions. 
The notion of accountability is central within the democratic theory because it represents 
the mechanism through which politicians are called to explain and to justify their actions to 
the electorate who, in turn, could sanction them for inappropriate conduct. As bureaucracies 
and agencies gained relevance and autonomy in the policy-making process, responsibility for 
decisions has been distanced from voters. IRAs’ insulation from political interference was 
meant as necessary to guarantee that their decisions were time-consistent, credible, and 
impartial. However, on the other side, the delegation of powers from political institutions to 
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IRAs creates accountability problems because ‘the spread of independent regulators means 
that more and more aspects of our lives are shaped by decisions made by institutions that are 
not elected and that are not under the direct control of elected officials’ (Gilardi and Maggetti 
2011, 202). Voters, in fact, cannot directly sanction IRAs through elections because these 
agencies are isolated from the electoral cycle; thus, citizens should rely on scrutiny and 
eventual sanction made by elected politicians ‘on their behalf’.  
The delegation of regulatory powers from political actors to IRAs, indeed, has been 
complicated by other dynamics, particularly European integration. The process of 
Europeanisation that occurred in several policy sectors has led to the emergence of regulatory 
systems linking national IRAs to national governments, administrative courts, domestic firms, 
transnational networks and other stakeholders. Moreover, within these multi-level regulatory 
regimes, IRAs are called on to support the Commission in implementing ‘controversial 
decisions’ at the national level (Thatcher 2003, 133) and in supervising the correct 
functioning of competition and market integration. Multi-level processes have modified the 
regulatory environment in terms of actors involved and relationships between them and have 
finally influenced the capacity to make IRAs accountable. In this respect, Scott argues that 
new forms of accountability have flanked formal patterns of control over public agencies and 
that now ‘it is possible to conceive of a concept of ‘extended accountability’ within which 
traditional accountability is only part of a cluster of mechanisms through which public bodies 
are in fact held to account’ (2000, 48). 
Recent literature about the accountability of IRAs has tried to address these questions. 
Some studies have dealt with the implications of empowering non-majoritarian institutions 
according to the normative theory on democracy (Majone 1996b). Other studies have 
described mechanisms deployed by actors in various regulatory sectors and across countries 
to keep IRAs accountable (Schillemans 2008, 2011; Maggetti 2010; Verhoest et al. 2012). 
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Other scholars have developed models to assess accountability practices (Maggetti, 2010; 
Baldwin et al. 2012; Lodge and Stirton 2012; Biela and Papadopoulos 2014; Fernández-i-
Marín et al. 2014). However, the interplay between delegation, ‘multi-levelisation’ and 
accountability has not been thoroughly investigated. Notably, theoretical analysis of IRAs’ 
accountability in multi-level regulatory environment is still scarce. This is mainly due to the 
normative nature of the debate and to the fact that, as Bovens clearly affirms, ‘accountability 
as a virtue’ is a highly contested concept (2010, 949). 
The article is aimed at contributing to the debate by stating that any theoretical discussion 
about IRAs’ accountability should be framed in normative terms and, to be exact, should 
clarify which virtue accountability is. To move forward in the theoretical and empirical 
analysis of accountability of IRAs, we need to reconsider a crucial dimension that has been 
neglected so far, that is, the goals that accountability is expected to achieve. In the principal-
agent model, accountability serves to prevent IRAs from drifting from the contractual terms 
of delegation. Other approaches such as the ‘credibility thesis’ (Majone 1997; Gilardi 2008) 
emphasised other (and implicitly more relevant) goals to be pursued through accountability, 
such as regulatory efficiency and procedural fairness. Empirical research has widely accepted 
this thesis and supported it though the identification of possible accountability mechanisms 
without questioning their normative implications.  
In this article, indeed, I argue that in multi-level regulatory environments, the impact of 
devices adopted to improve the accountability of IRAs is generally weakened by the presence 
of a neutral idea of accountability focused on the achievement of good performance and/or 
fairness. However, when the notion of accountability is detached from its normative nature 
and, in particular, from democratic values, its power is diluted, and control on IRAs can be 
ineffective or manipulated to pursue other ends. The only way to strengthen the effect of 
accountability is to bring politics and democratic values back into the regulatory process.  
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The paper is structured as follows. Part 1 critically reviews the literature on the 
accountability of IRAs. It first concentrates on problems of ex ante and ex post controls in 
principal-agent relationships. Second, it analyses the accountability of agencies as a question 
of democratic legitimacy, and then it focuses on the main implications for holding IRAs 
accountable in current multi-level regulatory regimes. Part 2 assesses what I call 
‘accountability pitfalls’, i.e., problems emerging when accountability arrangements are put in 
place in multi-level regulatory environments. The discussion draws upon existing empirical 
research on regulation and, in particular, on data presented in Righettini and Nesti (2014)2. In 
Part 3, different types – and visions – of accountability are identified: accountability as a 
democratic value, accountability as a mechanism to improve regulatory performance and/or 
fairness, and accountability as a strategic opportunity for purpose-oriented forums. The paper 
concludes by discussing the political nature of accountability and suggests possible solutions 
to bring politics and its responsibilities back into the regulatory process. 
 
1. Theoretical Approaches to study the Accountability of IRAs 
The debate about IRA accountability has been framed within at least three approaches: 
the principal-agent theory, the democratic theory and the empirical study of independent 
regulation. 
In the first approach, the delegation of regulatory powers to IRAs is conceptualised as a 
relation between a political principal (generally the executive) and a bureaucratic agent (the 
IRA). The principal would delegate powers to the agent for at least four reasons (Majone 
1996a, 1996b, 1997; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2003, 4; Gilardi 2008, 30). First, through 
delegation, political actors try to obtain expertise in highly technical policy domains where 
regulatory tasks are particularly complex to manage. Second, delegation and insulation of 
regulatory decisions from political ‘fluctuations’ aim to enhance credible commitment in 
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crucial policy sectors where market players need stability for their investments. Third, 
delegation reduces decision-making costs for reaching agreements and for overcoming 
information asymmetries. Finally, delegation through agencies creates a ‘scapegoat’ to be 
blamed for unpopular decisions or policy failures. The rationale behind the IRAs’ diffusion, 
therefore, assumes that political actors would transfer part of their regulatory powers to IRAs 
because IRAs are highly technical organisations with the proper expertise to achieve effective 
policy outcome, the proper stability to ensure a reliable regulatory environment for business 
and the proper independence to control firms and to protect the public interest. 
Delegation, nevertheless, entails some risks or agency losses (Gailmard 2014, 92-93). 
First, the principal may be unable to select the most appropriate agent because the principal 
may not have enough information about the competencies and preferences of the agent 
(raising the problem of adverse selection). Second, the agent, once selected, may pursue his or 
her own interests instead of, or that could be adversarial to, the principal’s interests (raising 
the problem of moral hazard). Principals should therefore adopt measures to reduce 
information asymmetries. Moreover, they should monitor agents to prevent them from 
exercising delegated powers in an arbitrary and discretionary way. 
Agency losses can be contained ex ante by the principal through contract design or 
screening and selection mechanisms (Strøm 2000, 12). In the first case, the principal pre-
defines the system of incentives available to the agent and the reciprocal gains deriving from 
delegation. In the second case, the principal outlines the criteria for the selection of the correct 
agent. 
Agency losses can also be contained ex post, after the delegation has been made. 
According to McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987), control may be exerted through three 
types of devices. The first type of device is the adoption of police-patrols. These mechanisms 
usually include the obligation for the President of an agency to undergo parliamentary 
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hearings and/or to report to Ministries, to regularly illustrate the agency’s activities and/or to 
respond to specific interrogations and to submit budgets to audit commissions. Another type 
of control is fire alarms, i.e., monitoring made by constituents to assess whether the agency 
acts in a fair way. Finally, controls can include deck-stacking, that is, administrative 
procedures and rules that constrain the agency behaviour. Deck-stacking, in particular, refers 
to the ability of the coalition that created the agency to maintain the decision-making 
environment and the bargaining struck among members stable over time (McCubbins et al. 
1987, 255). 
The democratic theory discusses the problem of accountability of agencies as a 
problem of democratic legitimacy. The reasons behind the need for making independent 
regulation accountable derive from the normative principle that agencies should be prevented 
from exercising delegated powers in an arbitrary and discretionary way. Deviation from 
mandates, in fact, would break the delegation chain and eventually weaken the citizens’ 
democratic control. According to the normative theory of democracy, the IRAs’ legitimacy 
represents a problem because agencies are not obliged to give voters explanations and 
justifications for their actions, and consequently, IRAs may not be sanctioned for their actions 
(Bovens 2007, 451). An attempt to solve the problem of IRAs’ legitimacy has been to justify 
their creation on the basis of their efficiency, their problem-solving capacity and their 
expertise (Majone 1996b, 296; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2003, 19-20). In other words, a shift 
of focus from ‘input’ to ‘output legitimacy’ (Scharpf 1999, 2007) 3  occurred, and 
accountability, according to this perspective, has become the mechanisms through which 
different forums, namely citizens and all of the relevant stakeholders, assess the IRAs’ 
capacity to achieve the expected policy results. 
Following Majone (1996b), empirical studies of IRAs proposed to reframe the concept of 
accountability in procedural terms by taking into consideration the emergence of European 
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networks of IRAs (Cohen and Thatcher 2008; Maggetti 2010, 4). In multi-level regulatory 
environments, in fact, trans-national networks can promote accountability through peer 
reviews and mutual controls. IRAs participate in networks, cooperate with other IRAs 
through the exchange of information and expertise and can be judged for their activities. 
Sanctions, in this case, rest much more on blame and loss of reputation than in material 
consequences. Indeed, reputation, which is ‘a set of symbolic beliefs about an organization, 
beliefs embedded in multiple audiences’ (Carpenter 2009, 10), is a crucial resource for 
regulators to enhance trust in future cooperation and to bind them to reached agreements 
(Downs and Jones 2002). Multi-level accountability mechanisms operating at the EU level 
incentivise IRAs to maintain a high reputation to be credible and to be positively judged by 
the European Commission and other national IRAs. 
All of the three approaches illustrated above tried to address the problem of 
accountability of IRAs through the adoption of a different perspective. In the principal-agent 
model, the core element is the direct, hierarchical oversight conducted by political principals 
on IRA organisation and behaviour. In the democratic theory, the focus of the IRAs’ 
legitimacy is shifted from the input to the output side. Legitimacy, in this case, depends not 
on the anchorage of IRAs’ decisions to voters’ preferences but rather on the IRAs’ capacity to 
produce effective policy outcomes. Accountability is the mechanism through which 
stakeholders can evaluate the IRAs’ performance. Finally, empirical research on independent 
regulation stresses the importance of procedural devices in keeping IRAs accountable and 
places particular emphasis on transnational European networks as means to induce IRAs to 
adopt the expected conduct.  
From a theoretical point of view, the debate about accountability of IRAs seems not to 
have moved too far. However, two critical issues emerge from the literature: First, there are 
some ‘hidden traps’ within each of the aforementioned approaches that make the promotion 
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of accountability more complex in practice than it appears in theory. Second, the issue of 
accountability has been primarily addressed by taking into consideration only some questions 
(i.e., ‘to whom, about what and how the IRA should render account’) but leaving almost 
underexplored a crucial one: Why are IRAs still expected to be accountable to a forum?  
In the following, I will introduce the main drawbacks of the debate about the 
accountability of IRAs, and I discuss them with reference to some empirical evidence from 
research on the telecommunications sector. Then, I turn back to the issue of the relevance of 
accountability by arguing that the analytical frames adopted so far hamper the possibility to 
move the discussion ahead because they are too focussed on actors and modes of 
accountability while leaving unresolved a crucial question: What is the purpose of 
accountability in regulatory regimes? 
 
2 Accountability Pitfalls 
2.1 Competing Principals 
The principal-agent theory rests on the assumption that the chain of delegation is simple, 
as in the case of the Presidential system in the US, where voters directly elect some offices, 
and which heavily relies on ex post controls (Strøm 2000, 13). In parliamentary systems, on 
the contrary, there are more stages of delegation, and control depends on ex ante oversight 
(Strøm 2000, 14). However, multi-level regulations transformed the governance approach to 
public service delivery from hierarchical steering to a more decentred and diffused policy 
style, where actors from different institutional levels and with different natures interact to 
produce regulatory decisions. Within this system, vertical and hierarchical links between the 
agent, i.e., the IRA, and the principal, i.e., the parental Ministry, have been complicated by 
the emergence of multiple ‘executives’ responsible for regulation. 
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In multi-level regulatory environments, a linear delegation chain hardly emerges because 
principals are composite and may have incoherent or competitive preferences that weaken 
their capacity to control the agent (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2003, 6). Ex ante controls, in 
fact, can be diluted by the unbalanced distribution of delegating powers between the European 
Commission and Member States due to their shared regulatory competencies. An example is 
the case of telecommunications, where the organisation and specific competences of IRAs are 
not detailed by European legislation. According to Directive 2009/140/EC4, for instance, 
IRAs are solely expected to fulfil some regulatory duties (identification of relevant markets, 
definition of terminal rates, regulation of access and interconnection to communications 
networks, definition of Universal Service obligations, etc.) and to cooperate with the 
European Commission to guarantee the correct implementation of the EU regulatory 
framework at the national level. However, the definition of additional and/or specific 
regulatory tasks and of criteria to appoint IRAs’ heads is left to the Member states’ discretion 
(Righettini and Nesti 2014, 86). There are, therefore, two principals (the Commission and 
Member States) in the delegation chain with concurrent powers, but ex ante controls over the 
agent are concentrated in the hand of only one principal (each Member State). Thus, the 
Commission and Member States may have competing preferences about developments and 
regulation of specific policy sectors. Moreover, unclear preferences of the principal regarding 
the distribution of functions among different actors in the regulatory arena may lead to the 
delegation of competing mandates among agents, as in the case of telecommunications, where 
IRAs often have overlapping competences with antitrust agencies (Righettini and Nesti 2014, 
92-93). The direct consequence is that delegation is jeopardised among member States. 
 
2.2. ‘Trivial’ Accountability 
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The unclear role assigned to the Commission also weakens ex post controls. Again, the 
telecommunication sector offers an interesting example. Article 7 and Article 7a of Directive 
2009/140/EC call on IRAs to identify and analyse communications markets taking into 
account the Commission Recommendation on relevant markets5 and its guidelines on market 
analysis and assessment of Significant Market Power. Through the notification procedure, 
IRAs inform the Commission about the draft measures that they will implement. The 
Commission can express its concerns about an IRA’s decision and can ask it to explain its 
choices. The IRA, in turn, should answer to each doubt cast by the Commission by explaining 
its conduct in a detailed way. Whenever the Commission considers that a measure proposed 
by the IRA is in contrast with Community law or creates a barrier to the Single Market, it may 
ask the agency to suspend, to amend or even to withdraw it. Hence, the notification procedure 
could be an important accountability device to ensure the consistent implementation of EU 
regulations across member States. Yet, the power of the Commission as an accountability 
forum is purely symbolic because IRAs should take utmost account of Commission requests 
to review their measures, but they can finally do what they want if they provide a reasoned 
justification for their choices (European Commission 2013). 
In parallel, ex post accountability exerted at the national level is also weak. Public 
reporting and budget scrutiny represent essential fire alarm mechanisms that allow 
Parliaments to monitor IRA behaviour and to prevent the IRAs’ deviation from the political 
mandate (Baldwin et al. 2012, 340). However, hearings are generally used by Parliaments and 
Ministries to ask IRAs for technical advice on specific issues rather than to control them 
(Righettini and Nesti 2014, 131). Moreover, there is no clear empirical evidence that hearings 
result in an effective imposition of sanctions on IRAs or in a consequent change in their 
regulatory behaviour (Schillemans and Busuioc 2015, 203). This probably due to the fact that 
several IRAs in the EU are not truly autonomous in managing their tasks and governments 
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still maintain strong roles in the regulatory arena (Thatcher 2003, 139). Furthermore, in many 
policy sectors, regulations have become so technical that governments are forced to grant 
specific regulatory tasks to IRAs because of their expertise, but, at the same time, these tasks 
seem to not be so salient as to require strong political control. 
In short, if the Commission and national political actors simply do not exert a strong 
control over IRAs and/or if they exercise their prerogatives as accountability forums only in a 
limited way, then the credibility and effectiveness of IRAs can be hardly assessed. 
 
2.3 Symbolic participation 
Some concluding considerations can be made about accountability traps in multi-level 
regulation.  
The first relevant problem relates to openness and transparency of regulatory processes. 
In several policy sectors, IRAs are called on to organise public consultations and public 
hearings with relevant stakeholders to discuss their decisions. Consultations with interested 
parties are mandatory in the telecommunications sector when IRAs have to issue measures 
with significant impact on relevant markets (ex art. 6 of the Framework Directive) and when 
user rights are at stake (ex art. 33 par. 1-2 of the Universal Service Directive). The opening-up 
of channels for direct participation in decision-making processes is the most common form of 
‘participatory systems of control’ of IRAs (Levi-Faur 2011, 14).	As an accountability device, 
consultations enable regulated firms, citizens, and associations to engage in dialogue with 
IRAs and to ask them for different courses of action (Righettini and Nesti 2014, 101). In the 
words of Ofcom: ‘Consultation is an essential part of regulatory accountability the means by 
which those people and organisations affected by our decisions can judge what we do and 
why we do it’ (2007).  
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The real impact of stakeholder participation, nevertheless, remains questionable. As 
already emphasized by literature, in multi-level governance systems only defined social 
partners that represent selected interests of civil society are involved (Piattoni 2010, 204). 
This general trend is also confirmed in the telecommunication sector, where private 
companies tend to participate more than common citizens in consultations (Righettini and 
Nesti 2014, 128) 6. Furthermore, the real impact of stakeholder recommendations in reframing 
the content of regulation is difficult to assess.  
Thus, although accountability to private stakeholders through participation is moderately 
strong, accountability to citizens remains weak. In Van Kesbergen and Van Waarden’s words: 
‘Privatization and delegation to ‘independent’ regulatory agencies give citizens fewer chances 
to control such agencies through voice’ (2004, 160). 
 
2.4 Strategic gaming 
Another relevant characteristic of multi-level regulatory processes is the increased 
involvement of the judicial power in decision-making, that is ‘part of a broader tendency of 
increasing juridification of social relations’ (Van Kesbergen and Van Waarden 2004, 153). 
Judicial review is recognised as an important mechanism to keep IRAs accountable (OECD 
2012, 29; ITU-infoDev 2004). As affirmed by the UK Department for Business Innovation 
and Skills, in fact, ‘appeals are a key way of holding regulators to account, and are a means 
by which regulatory decisions can be corrected where appropriate’ (BIS 2013, 23). 
However, judicial review can also be a strategic opportunity for regulated firms to control 
IRAs’ behaviour. European and national regulations, in fact, often grant firms the possibility 
to contest IRAs’ decisions, and firms fully seize this opportunity because they can rely on 
more legal resources than IRAs to be engaged in lengthy appeals7.  
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Moreover, the predictability of the regulatory process can be undermined by the 
possibility for courts to suspend the decision of an IRA submitted to appeal, to judge only 
procedural aspects of it or, finally, to review it on its merits8. The ‘on the merit review’ was 
originally aimed at granting certainty to the regulatory process, ensuring that any error made 
during the decision-making stage could be corrected in the end. Nevertheless, as recently 
argued by the UK Government, merit-based appeals ‘could reduce the credibility of the 
regulator, particularly where there is a concern that the appeal body could act as a second 
regulator ‘waiting in the wings’, and in turn negatively affect regulatory certainty’ (BIS 2013, 
23). 
Legal accountability is defined as ‘the most unambiguous type of accountability, as the 
legal scrutiny is based on detailed legal standards, prescribed by civil, penal or administrative 
statutes, or precedent’ (Bovens 2007, 456). Hence, judicial review is invoked as the most 
impartial way to keep IRAs accountable. Our discussion, indeed, reveals that judicial review 
is far from a neutral activity. First, litigation can be a strategic option for all of the well-
resourced operators that find a positive trade-off between engaging in a costly legal action and 
delaying wherever possible the regulatory enforcement. Although some authors are sceptical 
about the real impact of ‘gaming the system’ since litigation for firms is ‘costly, uncertain, 
diverts management time and attracts adverse attention’ (Veljanovski 2010, 97), nevertheless, 
empirical research reveals that regulated firms tend to appeal IRAs’ decision systematically to 
cause prejudice to IRAs and other firms, even if the result of appealing is uncertain 
(Righettini and Nesti 2014, 160). Second, administrative courts are not neutral actors in the 
accountability process (de Figueiredo 2005) because they are interested in expanding their 
influence on the regulatory environment, due to the possibility that they have to examine the 
merit of decisions and eventually to replace them. 
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2.5 Undemocratic networking 
The last relevant characteristic of multi-level regulatory environment is the creation of 
European transnational networks made by national IRAs and the European Commission, 
aimed at coordinating and supervising the implementation of regulations. Within networks, 
IRAs exchange their experiences, define common guidelines to cope with regulatory 
consistency across member States and engender mutual learning. Majone, in particular, 
emphasises their importance as accountability forums and labels them ‘bearers of reputation’ 
(1997, 272). Through peer reviews, in fact, networks informally and formally constrain IRAs 
(Maggetti 2010, 4) and force them to conform their actions to the networks’ expectations. For 
some scholars, participation in networking is an opportunity to improve controls over the 
IRAs’ behaviour because deliberation, peer review, cooperation and exchange of good 
regulatory practices enhance procedural forms of accountability (Majone 1999; Cohen and 
Thatcher 2008; Maggetti 2012). However, not all scholars agree with such an optimistic 
vision. Papadopoulos (2010), for instance, questions the democratic anchorage of governance 
through networks because they lack visibility and they are uncoupled and remote from 
democratic institutions. European regulatory networks, in fact, usually operate outside formal 
policy-making but in cooperation with the European Commission. Additionally, within 
networks, tensions often arise. Members, in fact, can use bargaining to impose their policy 
idea on other IRAs and also on the Commission. Thus, relationships within networks are not 
necessarily cooperative but rather they can also be highly dialectical (Saz-Carranza and 
Longo 2012), and accountability is substantially weakened by the complex nature of such 
relations (Papadopoulos 2010, 1039). In the same vein, Piattoni argues that loosely coupled 
relationships among actors in multi-level systems, albeit open and in a sense much more 
democratic, render delegation and accountability lines unclear (2010, 226-227). 
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2.6 Accountability Stalemates 
To sum up, multi-level regulation opens up new venues for accountability at the vertical 
and at the horizontal level, but de facto, these venues barely guarantee effective control over 
the IRAs’ behaviour. 
Vertical accountability is complicated by the presence of multiple principals (the 
European Commission and national governments) with divergent and possibly unclear 
preferences about the regulatory goals and is weakened by the lack of effective interest at the 
national level to keep IRAs under control. In such a context, the structure of incentives 
available to principals to steer agents’ behaviour can be narrow – due to limited powers held 
by supranational principals – or at least symbolic – due to limited and/or not salient functions 
delegated to the agent. 
Horizontal forms of accountability primarily entail stakeholders participation, networking 
and judicial review. Scott (2000) argued that extended accountability is structured around 
actors who depend on each other to exchange resources (information, expertise, authority) and 
who are mutually constrained by each other’s behaviour. Empirical research, nevertheless, 
reveals that in horizontal accountability, forums often have a pure symbolic nature. 
Accountability, in fact, depends on the effective capacity of a forum to impose sanctions on 
IRAs (Biela and Papadopoulos, 2014), an option that is not realistic, for instance, in the case 
of an individual citizen participating in consultations. Moreover, forums can act in an 
opportunistic way, using accountability to pursue their strategic goals, as in the case of 
appeals to courts.  
In multi-level regulatory regimes, in sum, there are little opportunities to implement 
effective accountability mechanisms to keep IRAs under control because the responsibility for 
oversight of IRAs is fragmented, the power to sanction them is scattered among different 
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actors and rationales for accountability ultimately rest on the forums’ view of what 
accountability should serve. 
 
3 The Aims of Accountability 
The last point introduces my final argument. The proliferation of agencies in several 
regulatory domains at the national level, coupled with the process of agencification that has 
occurred at the European Union level, indicates that delegation to independent regulatory 
bodies has been viewed as a particularly attractive solution to improve technical policy-
making. At the same time, the fact that IRAs are placed at an arm’s length from politics casts 
doubt on their legitimacy and raises concerns about the possibility that they act in an arbitrary 
way. Several theoretical and empirical studies have tackled the question of how to control 
agencies, but, at the end, these studies have only come to prove how difficult and, to a certain 
extent, ineffective this task could be. The accountability of IRAs is problematic because the 
notion and, in particular, the aims of accountability are framed in terms that are too neutral.  
Two main tendencies, in fact, have characterised the debate about the legitimacy of IRAs 
so far. First, there has been a gradual shift in the academic discourse from the term ‘control’ 
to the term ‘accountability’. As Busuioc (2009) already pinpointed, the two concepts entail 
different logics regarding oversight and different relationships between actors. Control refers 
to the direct steering made by an actor of another who is subordinate. Accountability entails 
dialogue, justification and possible sanctions and involves actors not necessarily in a 
hierarchical relation. This semantic shift was driven by the diffusion of multi-level and 
network approaches that theorise the redistribution of decisional powers among different 
actors, in contrast to the hierarchical relationships depicted in the principal-agent model. In 
these models, horizontal interactions prevail and political actors share their decisional power 
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with other actors not necessarily subordinated to them. Hence, the role of politics in the 
accountability relationship is definitely weakened.  
The second parallel and correlated tendency has been the reframing of the term 
accountability. The transfer of regulatory competences to ‘runaway bureaucracies’ has been 
viewed with suspicion by democratic theorists yet justified in terms of regulatory efficiency, 
credibility, and market stability. International organisations and national governments have 
also placed emphasis on regulatory performance. The OECD and the ITU, for instance, 
highlighted the importance of accountability to promote credibility and trust in regulation 
(ITU-infoDev 2004; Jacobzone 2005, 74). In the UK, the House of Lords (2004) has stressed 
the importance of accountability as a tool for improving regulatory effectiveness and 
protection of public interest. Making independent regulators accountable should enable, in 
fact, the Government and the Parliament ‘to review regulation and ensure that the legislation 
remains fit for purpose’ (House of Lords 2004, 16). 
Following this trajectory, the idea and the aims of accountability have also been 
transformed. Other notions of accountability have gradually replaced the traditional, 
democratic concept of accountability referred to as Parliament oversight on behalf of voters. 
Accountability becomes a means to promote policy effectiveness and/or fair treatment of all 
of the stakeholders in the regulatory process (Behn 2001, 9-11). The theoretical and empirical 
analysis on accountability and all of the related pitfalls illustrated in the previous sections 
confirm this idea. Simple delegation chains between governments and bureaucracies have 
been complicated by the creation of IRAs and by the redistribution of regulatory powers 
between national and supranational arenas due to European integration. This process is part of 
the more general trend of ‘relocation of politics’ (Bovens et al. 1995, cited in Hupe and 
Edwards 2012, 177) through which political decisions have been moved outside the 
traditional democratic circuit (Bevir 2013). Within this scenario, IRAs can barely be held 
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accountable in pure democratic terms. The literature assumes that the IRAs’ compliance with 
voters’ preferences is irrelevant for at least three reasons. First, IRAs are not elective bodies, 
so voters cannot directly sanction them. Second, IRAs are independent bodies that should 
maintain a certain degree of autonomy to perform their regulatory tasks efficiently. 
Democratic accountability has therefore become simply irrelevant because, again, politics has 
become irrelevant compared to the importance of expertise. As also shown by empirical 
research, the political oversight of IRAs at the national level is now declining (Baldwin et al. 
2012, 349). Democratic forums that are supposed to control IRAs, such as Parliaments and or 
parental Ministries, in fact, seem not to have enough power or simply the interest to do this 
(Schillemans and Busuioc 2015, 205). But the lack of political control is not compensated for 
by political checks operating at the European level because neither the Commission nor the 
European Parliament have the formal authority to hold national IRAs accountable. This 
tendency has been exacerbated by the need for the Commission to reach compromises with 
national Governments and IRAs to ensure regulatory compliance. In Lowi’s words (1986, 
318-319), the parts, due to their relatively weak position in the multi-level regulatory 
environment, negotiate their interests to reach a reciprocal satisfactory agreement on 
regulatory outputs (compromise through weakness). However, they also agree to render 
regulatory goals sufficiently vague to mould them to their expectations (compromise through 
vagueness). This means that IRAs cannot be held accountable for goals that are not specified 
but ‘you can’t have accountability without expectations. If you want to hold people 
accountable, you have to be able to specify what you expect them to do and not to do’ (Behn 
2001, 7). 
Lacking democratic aims to guide accountability and strong political forums capable of 
pursuing them, other forums can manipulate the process to achieve their own interests. The 
20 
only way to avoid drawbacks is to reinforce the democratic and political dimensions of 
accountability. 
 
Conclusions 
In this article, I have analysed the issue of accountability of IRAs as a normative 
problem. I illustrated that the notion of accountability changed over time and that its focus has 
shifted from democracy to performance and fairness. This process has made accountability 
rationales vague and, consequently, mechanisms to ensure them ineffective. I also argued that 
this attempt to frame accountability in neutral and de-politicised terms has been supported by 
several theories and justified in practice by invoking the need for regulatory consistency and 
effectiveness. This idea collides, nevertheless, with the empirical evidence that any regulatory 
process is inherently political and that actors within the regulatory arena can pursue their own 
strategies. Mechanisms to hold IRAs accountable can be part of these strategies.  
To be meaningful, accountability should be considered as a means to improve not only 
policy performance but also, and rather, the governance of public goods and as a way to 
protect the public interest. Reframing accountability in political terms implies that political 
actors should be charged with more responsibilities for regulatory activities. A remedy could 
be to define the delegation chain and to redistribute the authority between principals. At the 
European level, more power to steer the multi-level regulatory process should be assigned to 
the Commission and more power to oversee it should be granted to the European Parliament. 
The European Parliament, in fact, has increased its relevance as watchdog of EU agencies 
(Kelemen 2012, p. 398), but its role in multi-level regulatory processes and its capacity to 
keep national IRAs accountable is still underdeveloped. At the national level, Ministries could 
delegate some function to IRAs, but Ministries should also remain finally responsible for 
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policy outcomes whereas National Parliaments should participate in the accountability 
process more actively. 
A final remark should be made about the role of citizens within the accountability 
process. In their outline of four worldviews of accountability, Lodge and Stirton (2012, 361) 
identify two different conceptions of the role of citizens in the accountability process. In the 
first conception, the ‘consumer sovereignty’, providers of goods and services are usually 
accountable on a voluntary basis because transparency and accountability are a good 
‘marketing strategy’ to attract more customers. Citizens, for their part, are totally informed 
consumers who exploit the accountability ‘venue’ to take the best choice in their interest. The 
second view, the ‘citizen empowerment’, emphasises the relevance of citizen participation in 
the accountability process. In the same vein, Hupe and Edwards (2012) find in deliberative 
democracy a strategy to democratise complex governance settings. Examples of such 
practices can be drawn from the European telecom sector, where citizens are involved in the 
regulatory process through consultations or participation in consumers’ committees. In all of 
these approaches, indeed, individual citizens are supposed to be well-informed actors. 
However, this situation hardly occurs, especially in highly technical policy sectors, because 
regulation entails information asymmetries that citizens can barely overcome. Empirical 
analysis, in fact, revealed that citizens do not participate very actively in public consultations. 
Moreover, consumers’ committees, albeit present, seem not to have enough power to alter 
significantly the regulatory process in their favour (Righettini and Nesti 2014, 126-128).  
From a democratic point of view, therefore, citizens cannot be engaged in the 
accountability process only to protect their interests as consumers, and they cannot be 
empowered only through deliberation because these approaches imply a selective voicing of 
specific interests and definitely weaken the pursuit of the public interest. Again, political 
accountability is unavoidable. 
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To conclude, independent regulation should be anchored to democratic circuits, and the 
accountability of IRAs, to be effective, cannot be detached from its democratic rationale. 
Otherwise, we should accept the notion that ‘”nonmajoritarian” is little more than a 
euphemism for “undemocratic”’ (Bevir 2013, 144). 
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Notes 
 
                                                
1 For recent accounts of origins and diffusions of IRAs, see Gilardi (2008), Jordana and Levi-
Faur (2010), Jordana, Levi-Faur and Fernandez-i-Marin (2011). 
2 The research was supported by the University of Padova (grants CPDA 11535/11 and 
60A16-1482/10). 
3 According to Scharpf (2006), “input legitimacy” is ensured where political decisions mirror 
the electorate’s preferences and where policy-making allows for its participation - in this 
sense, it could be conceived as “government by the people”. Instead, “output legitimacy”, or 
“government for the people”, derives from the decision makers’ capacity to adopt effective 
policies. 
4 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, 
electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 337/50, 18/12/2009. 
5 Commission Recommendation of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
6 A possible explanation of this tendency is that IRAs manage consultations in different ways 
in terms of duration, documents available to the public and formulation of texts submitted to 
consultations. Firms are more incentivized than citizens to participate because they have the 
necessary competencies to fully understand the content of consultation. 
7 The European Commission has reported since 1999 that member States have long appeal 
procedures that make the regulatory process in the telecommunications sector unpredictable. 
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Larouche and Taton (2011, 108) have estimated that the average length of appeal proceedings 
across member States is 18 months, but significant variations are present at the national level 
(in France, the average length is 14 months, in the UK, the average length is 15 months and in 
Italy the procedure could last up to 4 years). 
8 Judicial review looks at the ‘integrity’ of the process through which the decision has been 
made, whereas the ‘on the merit’ standard assesses whether the decision was reasoned and if 
those reasons were correct (Smith, 2012, 174-175). 
 
 
 
 
